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IN DEFENSE OF NON-NATURAL, 
NON-THEISTIC MORAL REALISM
Erik J. Wielenberg
Many believe that objective morality requires a theistic foundation. I maintain 
that there are sui generis objective ethical facts that do not reduce to natural 
or supernatural facts. On my view, objective morality does not require an ex­
ternal foundation of any kind. After explaining my view, I defend it against a 
variety of objections posed by William Wainwright, William Lane Craig, and 
J. P. Moreland.
1. Introduction
Of the main kinds of philosophical theistic arguments, the moral argu­
ment appears to be among the most popular and psychologically effective. 
Consider these remarks by William Lane Craig:
I think the moral argument is the most effective [argument for the­
ism] . . . which says that apart from God, there is no absolute founda­
tion for moral values. Therefore, if you're going to affirm the value 
of things like tolerance, love, fair play, the rights of women, and so 
forth, you need to have a transcendent anchor point. You need to 
have God. . . . [T]his argument has tremendous appeal to students. It 
is one to which they respond.1
The moral argument comes in many varieties. As Craig's remarks indicate, 
he favors a version of the argument based on the idea that theism—and 
only theism—provides an adequate foundation for objective moral truth.* 2 
To say that a moral truth is 'objective' in the relevant sense is to say that 
its truth is independent of human mental states in a certain way. Craig 
explains the concept like this:
[T]o say, for example, that the Holocaust was objectively wrong is 
to say that it was wrong even though the Nazis who carried it out
John D. Martin, "A Few Minutes with Dr. William Lane Craig," from the Focus 
on the Family website: www.family.org / faith / A000000729.cfm (accessed 5 /22/08).
2I use the term 'theism' in what I take to be a fairly standard way: It indicates 
the doctrine that there exists a unique omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, 
necessarily existing creator of the universe.
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thought that it was right and that it would still have been wrong 
even if the Nazis had won World War II and succeeded in extermi­
nating or brainwashing everyone who disagreed with them.3 4
In this paper I explain and defend a view that might be given the catchy 
title non-natural non-theistic moral realism.4 It is a version of moral realism in 
that it implies that there exist ethical facts that are objective in the sense 
just explained. It is non-natural in that it implies that ethical facts and prop­
erties are not reducible to natural facts and properties. And it is non-theistic 
in that it implies that objective morality does not require a theistic founda­
tion; indeed, the view implies that objective morality does not require an 
external foundation at all. In calling the view non-theistic I do not mean to 
imply that the view entails atheism; the view is compatible with theism 
as well as atheism. But it does imply that there are objective ethical facts 
even if atheism is true.
After explaining the basic elements of this view, I defend it against a 
variety of objections raised by William Wainwright, William Craig, and 
J. P Moreland. Each of these critics favors some version of the view that 
theism grounds objective morality. I will provide a defense of my view 
in that I will seek to show that none of the objections to my view raised 
by these critics that I discuss here yields a good reason to prefer a theism- 
based approach to objective morality over my own approach. This defense, 
if successful, contributes to the larger project of showing that theistic moral 
arguments rooted in the notion that there are objective moral truths only 
if the traditional God of monotheism exists are philosophically flawed, 
whatever their popularity.5
Because my theistic opponents and I agree that there are objective ethi­
cal facts, I will not present any positive arguments for the existence of 
such facts in this paper. Those who are suspicious of the whole idea of 
objective ethical truth may nevertheless find the paper of interest in that 
it touches on issues that are relevant to some of the popular reasons for 
skepticism about realism in ethics.6
2. The Basic View
A fundamental category of existing thing is the category of states o f affairs. 
States of affairs are necessarily existing abstract entities that obtain or fail to 
obtain. Facts are obtaining or actual states of affairs; among these, some are 
contingent, meaning they obtain in some but not all metaphysically possi­
3William Lane Craig and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, God? A Debate Between a 
Christian and an Atheist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 17. For a more 
detailed explanation of the sort of objectivity involved here, see Michael Huemer, 
Ethical Intuitionism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 2-4.
4I should note that throughout the paper I use the terms 'moral' and 'ethical' 
synonymously.
5For additional elements of this larger project, see Erik Wielenberg, Value and 
Virtue in a Godless Universe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
6Thanks to Tom Flint and an anonymous reader for Faith and Philosophy for as­
sistance in clarifying some of the key claims in this introductory section.
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ble worlds, whereas others are necessary, meaning they obtain in all meta­
physically possible worlds.7 The state of affairs in which Alvin Plantinga is 
a philosopher obtains contingently; the state of affairs in which Alvin Plant­
inga is not identical to the number two obtains necessarily. Among states 
of affairs that obtain necessarily, some are relatively uninteresting in that 
the sentences that express them are devoid of substantive content. The state 
of affairs in which all bachelors are unmarried may fall into this category. 
But other necessary states of affairs are not trivial in this way.8 Many theists 
maintain that the state of affairs in which God exists is a substantive, inter­
esting state of affairs that holds in all metaphysically possible worlds.9
Some facts obtain because of the obtaining of other states of affairs. 
Consider, for example, the fact that the bottle of water in my office is sus­
pended about four feet from the surface of the earth. This state of affairs 
obtains because another state of affairs obtains—namely, that the bottle is 
sitting on the surface of the desk in my office.10 *Some states of affairs that 
obtain are what we may call brute facts; their obtaining is not explained 
by the obtaining of other states of affairs.11 Theists typically maintain that 
the fact that God exists is a brute fact. As Richard Swinburne puts it, "[n] 
o other agent or natural law or principle or necessity is responsible for 
the existence of God. His existence is an ultimate brute fact."12 Many such 
theists also maintain that God exists necessarily. There is, therefore, a 
tradition in monotheism according to which the fact that God exists is 
a substantive, metaphysically necessary, brute fact. Craig, among others, 
belongs to this tradition.13
Some states of affairs involve ethical properties, properties like moral 
rightness, moral wrongness, goodness, evil, virtue, vice, and the like. 
Ethical properties are sui generis properties that are not reducible to other 
kinds of properties, including natural properties that can be studied by the 
empirical sciences and supernatural properties involving God. The view
T am working with Alvin Plantinga's notion of states of affairs and metaphysi­
cal necessity (sometimes called "broad logical necessity") here. See Alvin Plant­
inga, The Nature o f Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 2, 44—45. 
For more on this understanding of states of affairs, see Roderick Chisholm, "The 
Defeat of Good and Evil," Proceedings and Addresses o f the American Philosophical 
Association 42 (1968-1969), p. 23.
8In the old days, philosophers used the terms 'analytic' and 'synthetic' to mark 
out the distinction to which I am alluding here.
9See, for example, Plantinga, Nature o f Necessity, pp. 215-216.
10Other states of affairs—e.g., states of affairs involving gravity—may also play 
an explanatory role here.
UI should emphasize that bruteness is an ontological rather than epistemologi­
cal concept; that a given fact is brute does not imply that it cannot be proven or 
inferred from other things one knows. Also, that a fact is brute is consistent with 
it being explained by itself (if this makes sense); this possibility is briefly explored 
in section 3 below.
12Richard Swinburne, The Coherence o f Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1977), p. 267.
13William Lane Craig, "Reply to Objections," in Does God Exist? The Craig-Flew 
Debate, ed. Stan Wallace (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 157, 162-163.
I hold is thus best characterized not as naturalism or supernaturalism but 
rather as non-naturalism.14
Some ethical states of affairs obtain; indeed, some of them obtain nec­
essarily. Consider, for instance, the state of affairs in which it is morally 
wrong to torture the innocent just for fun and the state of affairs in which 
pain is intrinsically bad (that is, bad in its own nature, or in and of itself). 
These states of affairs obtain not just in the actual world but in all meta­
physically possible worlds. Other ethical states of affairs hold contingently. 
For instance, suppose that by pushing a certain button I would knowingly 
torture an innocent person just for fun. This means that it is wrong for 
me to push the button, but this state of affairs holds contingently because 
there are possible worlds in which my pushing the button would not have 
such a nefarious result.
Of the ethical states of affairs that obtain necessarily, at least some 
are brute facts.15 That pain is intrinsically bad is not explained in terms 
of other states of affairs that obtain. Moreover, at least some necessarily 
obtaining brute ethical facts are not trivial but substantive.16 Therefore, I 
have an ontological commitment shared by many theists: I am commit­
ted to the obtaining of substantive, metaphysically necessary, brute facts. 
Some ethical facts fall into this category; I call such facts basic ethical facts. 
Such facts are the foundation of (the rest of) objective morality and rest 
on no foundation themselves. To ask of such facts, "where do they come 
from?" or "on what foundation do they rest?" is misguided in much the 
way that, according to many theists, it is misguided to ask of God, "where 
does He come from?" or "on what foundation does He rest"? The answer 
is the same in both cases: They come from nowhere, and nothing external 
to themselves grounds their existence; rather, they are fundamental fea­
tures of the universe that ground other truths.17
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14For a useful characterization of the three meta-ethical approaches mentioned 
here, see David Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations o f Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 22-23. G. E. Moore is perhaps the most 
well-known defender of the sort of non-naturalism I hold; see his Principia Ethica 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903). The view has seen something of 
a resurgence in recent years; see, for example, Colin McGinn, Ethics, Evil, and Fic­
tion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 7-60; Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral 
Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Huemer, Ethical 
Intuitionism. Elsewhere I characterized my view as a version of naturalism, but the 
label 'non-naturalism' is more appropriate given the way these terms are typically 
used in the field of meta-ethics.
15I should emphasize that I do not hold that any metaphysically necessary state 
of affairs must also be brute; I agree with Craig's view that necessary truths can 
"stand in relations of explanatory priority to one another"; see Craig, "Reply," in 
Wallace, Craig-Flew Debate, p. 169.
16See Moore, Principia Ethica, pp. 7 and 143.
17Richard Swinburne endorses a similar view; see Swinburne, Coherence o f Theism, 
pp. 183-209. There may be an important difference between Swinburne's view and 
my own; Swinburne characterizes the basic ethical facts as "analytic," whereas I 
maintain that they are synthetic. However, it may be that Swinburne is using 'ana­
lytic' in a non-standard way so that my basic view in this area is identical to his; see 
Craig, "Reply," in Wallace, Craig-Flew Debate, p. 186, n. 52.
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3. Supervenience
It is widely held that if moral properties are exemplified at all, they su­
pervene on non-moral properties.18 This supervenience thesis entails at 
least that any two possible entities that are identical with respect to their 
non-moral properties are identical with respect to their moral properties. 
William Wainwright explains this idea as follows:
On objectivist accounts . . . rightness supervenes on instances of truth­
telling, and goodness supervenes on pleasurable consciousness and 
certain character types (those exhibited by Marcus Aurelius, for ex­
ample, or St. Francis). In addition, the connection between the base 
properties and the supervenient properties is necessary.19
J. L. Mackie famously finds this alleged relationship puzzling:
What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a 
piece of deliberate cruelty-say, causing pain just for fun—and the 
moral fact that it is wrong? It cannot be an entailment, a logical or 
semantic necessity. Yet is it not merely that the two features occur 
together. The wrongness must somehow be 'consequential' or 'su­
pervenient'; it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But 
just what in the world is signified by this 'because'?20
The answer, I think, is that 'because' here indicates metaphysical necessity. 
It is true in all metaphysically possible worlds that causing pain just for 
fun is wrong. This is the sense in which a given action is wrong because 
it is a piece of deliberate cruelty.21 Mackie assumes without argument 
that there is no such thing as metaphysical necessity. The argument from 
queerness, therefore, simply begs the question against the view I hold.22 
Indeed, it begs the question against any view that countenances substan­
tive, metaphysically necessary truths, and hence begs the question against 
much of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion.
Wainwright maintains that the moral supervenes on the non-moral but 
suggests that such supervenience is more at home in a theistic universe 
than in a non-theistic one: "[T]he connection between the base property
18See, for example, Huemer, Ethical Intuitionism, p. 202 and p. 280, n. 7; Shafer- 
Landau, Moral Realism, pp. 77-78; Graham Oppy, Arguing about Gods (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 353; and Swinburne, Coherence o f Theism, p. 
185.
19William J. Wainwright, Religion and Morality (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005),
p. 66.
20J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (New York: Penguin, 1977), p. 41.
21A bit more precisely, the idea here is that of one property entailing another in 
the sense that necessarily, anything that has the property of being an instance of 
causing pain just for fun also has the property of moral wrongness; see Plantinga, 
Nature o f Necessity, p. 65, n. 1.
22See Quentin Smith, Ethical and Religious Thought in Analytic Philosophy o f Lan­
guage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 173.
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and the supervenient property can seem mysterious. For, in the absence 
of further explanation, the (necessary) connection between these radically 
different sorts of properties . . . is just an inexplicable brute fact."23 On 
my approach, the supervenience relationships under discussion here are 
logically equivalent to certain basic ethical facts. For example, the claim 
that the property of intrinsic badness supervenes on the property of pain 
is logically equivalent to the claim that necessarily, pain is intrinsically 
bad. So my view does have the feature that worries Wainwright; on my 
view, at least some of the supervenience relationships between moral 
and non-moral properties are brute facts. Is this a problem for my view? 
More precisely, does this aspect of my view constitute a reason to prefer 
an alternative view according to which the supervenience relationships in 
question are grounded in a perfect, necessarily existing God?
Wainwright at one point suggests that while trivial necessary truths 
do not require explanations, non-trivial ones do.24 If this is true, my ap­
proach is unacceptable because it posits brute, non-trivial necessary 
(ethical) truths. My response is to reject Wainwright's principle. Wain­
wright supports the principle by offering examples of non-trivial neces­
sary truths that, intuitively, seem to require explanations. But this only 
shows that some such truths require explanations, not that all do. Are 
there examples of non-trivial necessary truths that do not require ex­
planations? Ironically, many theists are committed to the existence of 
just such an example: that God exists. Such theists must join with me in 
rejecting Wainwright's principle. Without any general principle to guide 
us, we are left to consider putative non-trivial necessary truths on a case- 
by-case basis to determine which ones stand in need of further explana­
tion. For what it is worth, the ethical claim that pain is intrinsically bad 
seems to me not to cry out for further explanation; indeed, I find it less in 
need of explanation than the existence of a perfect person who created 
the universe.
Interestingly, Wainwright appears ultimately not to accept the general 
principle upon which the objection of the previous paragraph rests. In his 
discussion of the objection he asserts that "'[b]roadly' necessary truths do 
[stand in need of explanation]," but a footnote to this sentence reads: "Or 
at least some of them."25 Elsewhere, he argues that the existence of God 
does not cry out for explanation but that necessary ethical facts do.26 If 
correct, this claim might constitute a reason to prefer a theistic view that 
grounds objective morality in a necessarily existing God over my view; 
my view would be more mysterious than the theistic alternative.
23Wainwright, Religion and Morality, p. 66. Also see J. P. Moreland and William 
Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove, IL: In­
terVarsity Press, 2003), p. 493. Interestingly, Mackie also shows some sympathy 
for this kind of argument; see John Mackie, The Miracle o f Theism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), pp. 1l5—118.
24Wainwright, Religion and Morality, p. 66.
25Ibid., p. 66, n. 48.
26William J. Wainwright, "Response to Maria Antonaccio," Conversations in Re­
ligion and Theology 4.2 (November 2006), p. 224.
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Wainwright offers two reasons for his claim that God's existence does 
not cry out for explanation but necessary ethical facts do. The first is that 
God is essentially causeless whereas ethical facts are not.27 That is, there is 
no possible world in which God is caused to exist whereas, for any (pos­
sibly true) ethical state of affairs, there is some world in which it is caused 
to obtain. But why think this? My view is that at least some ethical facts are 
essentially causeless. For example, it seems to me that there is no possible 
world in which the state of affairs that pain is intrinsically bad is caused 
to obtain.
To support his contention that no ethical facts are essentially causeless, 
Wainwright says that "[a]n indication of this fact is that we can coher­
ently conceive that moral facts have causes. Divine command theories, 
for example, are not obviously incoherent."28 Note the weak sense of 
conceivability Wainwright employs here; he says that divine command 
theories are not obviously incoherent. (Presumably this is compatible with 
such theories having non-obvious incoherencies). Wainwright also relies 
here on the idea that there is some connection between conceivability and 
metaphysical possibility; the fact that a given state of affairs is conceivable 
is taken to be at least some indication that the state of affairs in question is 
metaphysically possible. Given the weak notion of conceivability he em­
ploys here, his claim that all moral facts are possibly caused rests on the 
principle that if p is not obviously incoherent, then p is metaphysically 
possible. The problem for Wainwright is that the very same principle can 
be used to argue that God does not exist in all possible worlds.29 It is not 
obviously incoherent, for example, that there is a stone floating in space 
with nothing else (including God) in existence. Perhaps there is some sort 
of incoherence in atheism; however, it is clear enough that this incoher­
ence is not obvious. Nevertheless, many theists, and certainly Wainwright, 
deny that God's existence is merely contingent, despite the fact that God's 
non-existence is conceivable in the weak sense of being not obviously in­
coherent. I similarly deny that all ethical facts are possibly caused, even if 
every moral fact having a cause is not obviously incoherent. The epistemic 
principle upon which Wainwright's argument depends therefore tells 
equally against my view and the theistic view and hence favors neither 
view over the other.
Wainwright's second reason for the view that God's existence does not 
demand an explanation in the way that necessary ethical facts do is that 
God's existence is "self-explanatory or intrinsically intelligible" which im­
plies that "if we could grasp [God's] nature we would see why it exists."30 
The claim here seems to be that there is an explanation for God's existence 
after all and that the explanation lies in God's nature. Since we do not have 
a complete understanding of God's nature we may not know the explana­
27Ibid., pp. 224-225.
28Ibid., p. 225.
29Hume has the character of Cleanthes use the principle in precisely this way; 
see David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 2nd edition (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1998), p. 55.
30Wainwright, "Response," pp. 224-225.
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tion for God's existence, but it is there nevertheless. Thus, that God exists 
is indeed non-trivial and necessary, but it is not brute.
It is not at all clear that this notion of a self-explanatory being is coher- 
ent.31 Wainwright himself remarks that the notion is "a bit opaque" but 
declares that it is "not obvious nonsense." This is hardly high praise, and 
in the context of worries about the relative "queerness" of my approach 
as compared with a theistic approach, the appeal to the obscure notion 
that God is a self-explanatory being hardly tips the scales in favor of the 
theistic approach. Even if coherent, the concept of a self-explanatory God 
is surely at least as mysterious as the bruteness of the ethical facts that it is 
supposed to help explain.
However, let us suppose that the concept of a self-explanatory being is 
coherent. Even with this assumption, Wainwright is still committed to the 
existence of non-trivial, necessary brute facts. The appeal to God's exis­
tence being self-explanatory seems merely to introduce a new non-trivial 
necessary truth into the picture: That God's nature has whatever myste­
rious feature(s) explains His existence. The presence of this remarkable 
property in the divine nature appears to lack an explanation.32 Perhaps it 
will be suggested that the same feature of God that explains His existence 
also explains His possession of that very feature, in which case this feature 
explains its own presence in the divine nature. Even if this makes sense, 
it still implies that the fact that God has the feature in question is a brute 
fact, since that it is included in the divine nature is not explained by a dis­
tinct state of affairs. Thus, the theistic approach still includes at least one 
non-trivial, necessary brute fact, and hence I see no non-question-begging 
reason to accept Wainwright's contention that non-trivial, necessary ethical 
facts cannot be brute.
Still, even if not all non-trivial necessary ethical facts need external 
explanations, it might be suggested that a theory that can explain such 
facts is, all else equal, superior to a theory that cannot explain them. This 
observation points toward another possible reason to prefer a theistic 
approach to my own. Wainwright suggests that at least some theistic ap­
proaches can explain the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral 
and that this feature of such approaches gives them an advantage over 
theories (like mine) that cannot offer a deeper explanation for the su- 
pervenience. Wainwright points to Robert Adams's theory in Finite and 
Infinite Goods as an example of a theistic approach that offers a deeper 
explanation for the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. How­
ever, it turns out that Adams's theory, like mine, entails the existence of 
brute ethical facts. To see this, we must examine some of the details of 
Adams's view.
31For an argument that it is not, see John Morreall, "God as Self-Explanatory," 
Philosophical Quarterly 30 (July 1980), pp. 206-214. Some have construed a self­
explanatory being simply as one that exists in every possible world (see Laura 
Garcia, "Can There Be a Self-Explanatory Being?" The Southern Journal o f Philoso­
phy 14.4 [1986], pp. 479-488), but Wainwright's understanding of the concept obvi­
ously goes beyond this.
32See Morreall, "Self-Explanatory," p. 209.
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Adams provides a sophisticated attempt to work out the idea that the 
Good = God. He proposes that God's nature is the standard of excellence 
and that other things are excellent in virtue of resembling the divine na­
ture (in the right way).33 This divine nature exists necessarily.34 The fact 
that the divine nature exists necessarily allegedly enables Adams's ap­
proach to account for the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. 
Consider one of Wainwright's earlier examples: The supervenience of 
goodness upon the character of Marcus Aurelius. On Adams's approach, 
this supervenience is grounded in the resemblance between Marcus Au­
relius's character and the necessarily existing divine nature.35 To keep 
matters simple, let us suppose that the aspect of Aurelius's character that 
makes it good is mercifulness. On Adams's account, the supervenience 
of goodness on Marcus Aurelius's character is explained by the fact that 
the divine nature is essentially merciful. In any world in which Aurelius's 
character is merciful, that character resembles the divine nature and hence 
is (in one respect at any rate) good.36 In this way, Adams's theory may be 
able to provide a foundation for some substantive, necessary ethical facts. 
However, as I noted above, the theory also entails that there are some such 
facts that are brute, as I will now illustrate.
Adams's claim that the Good = God is modeled after another identity 
claim: that water = H2O. One interesting feature of this second identity 
claim is that it is not true by definition; the meaning of the word 'water7 
includes nothing about its chemical composition, as shown by the fact 
that people used the word 'water' perfectly competently before the rise of 
modern chemistry. One lesson to be drawn from this example is that the 
meaning of a given term does not always reveal the full nature of the thing 
to which the term refers.37
Adams argues that, in a somewhat similar fashion, although the mean­
ing of the word 'good' includes nothing about God, it is nevertheless the 
case that the Good = God. So Adams's claim that the Good is God is a claim 
about the nature of the Good but is not at all a claim about the meaning of 
the word 'good' (or the word 'God'). Adams's account is reductive in that 
it implies that (at least some) ethical facts and properties just are supernat­
ural facts and properties. Facts about finite goodness just are facts about a 
certain sort of resemblance to God, and facts about moral obligation just 
are facts about God's commands.38
33Robert Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), pp. 28-38.
34Ibid., pp. 47-49.
35Graham Oppy argues that theism in fact cannot explain the supervenience of 
the moral on the non-moral, but his argument seems to overlook an approach like 
Adams's according to which the supervenience is grounded in God's necessarily 
existing essential nature; see Oppy, Gods, pp. 354-356.
36While Wainwright emphasizes this aspect of Adams's view, Adams himself 
does not. He discusses supervenience only briefly and in passing; see Adams, Fi­
nite and Infinite Goods, p. 61.
37Ibid., pp. 15-16.
38Ibid., pp. 36 and 249-250.
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Adams's view commits him to the existence of basic ethical facts in 
my sense-ethical facts that are substantive, metaphysically necessary, 
and brute. Among such facts are the following: That the Good exists, 
that the Good is loving, that the Good is merciful, and that the Good is 
just.39 It might be thought that Adams's theory does provide a founda­
tion for such ethical facts; doesn't the theory tell us, for instance, that 
the fact that the Good exists is grounded in the fact that God exists? The 
answer is no; since the Good just is God, the existence of God can hardly 
explain or ground the existence of the Good. In the context of Adams's 
view, the claim that God serves as the foundation of the Good is no more 
sensible than the claim that H2O serves as the foundation of water.40 In­
deed, once we see that, on Adams's view the Good = God, we see that 
Adams's theory entails that the Good has no external foundation, since 
God has no external foundation. It is not merely that Adams's view fails 
to specify where the Good came from; the theory implies that the Good 
did not come from anywhere.
The upshot is that while Adams's theory does explain some substan­
tive, metaphysically necessary ethical facts, it does so by appealing to 
other substantive, metaphysically necessary brute ethical facts. I think this 
is a perfectly reasonable approach; indeed, although I will not argue for it 
here, I think it is the only sensible approach to ethics. My own view is that 
any ethical fact that can be explained at all is explained at least in part by 
other ethical facts. I take it that this is the sort of thing philosophers have 
in mind when they talk about a "fact/value gap" or the impossibility of 
deriving an 'ought' from an 'is.'41
The important thing to see here, however, is that Adams's theistic ap­
proach and my non-theistic approach have the same basic structure: Some 
ethical claims are taken as substantive, metaphysically necessary, and 
brute; all other ethical claims are explained, at least in part, by these basic 
ethical facts. Both approaches imply that there are basic ethical facts. So it 
is hard to see why my approach should be considered more mysterious or 
queer than that of Adams.
The conclusion of all of this is as follows. Let us suppose that the two 
options on the table are the following: (i) objective ethics has as its ulti­
mate foundation some set of objective ethical facts, and (ii) objective ethics 
has as its ultimate foundation a necessarily existing perfect person. Both 
approaches ultimately ground objective morality on substantive, neces­
sary brute facts. Indeed, Adams's version of option (ii) grounds objective 
morality on substantive, necessary brute ethical facts. There may be a good 
reason to prefer one of these views over the other, but, as far as I can see, 
such a reason is not to be found in the issues of supervenience, explana­
tion, and conceivability that have been considered in the present section.
39Or, allowing for Wainwright's proposal discussed above, that the Good's na­
ture explains its existence.
40I take it that the uselessness of answering the question "why is there water?" 
with "because there is H2O" is obvious.
41Adams's view shows that these slogans are overly simple. On Adams's view 
some facts are values, and some "ought"s are "is"es.
DEFENSE OF MORAL REALISM 33
4. Mysterious, Floating Values
Wainwright is not the only theist to suggest that there is something prob­
lematic about the sort of approach I favor. William Craig and J. P. Moreland 
consider and criticize a view they label "atheistic moral realism." This view 
is at least in the same ballpark as my view. They characterize it this way:
Atheistic moral realists affirm that objective moral values and duties 
do exist and are not dependent on evolution or human opinion, but 
they also insist that they are not grounded in God. Indeed, moral 
values have no further foundation. They just exist.42
Craig and Moreland criticize this view as follows:
It is difficult, however, even to comprehend this view. What does it 
mean to say, for example, that the moral value justice just exists? It is 
hard to know what to make of this. It is clear what is meant when it 
is said that a person is just; but it is bewildering when it is said that 
in the absence of any people, justice itself exists. Moral values seem 
to exist as properties of persons, not as mere abstractions—or at any 
rate, it is hard to know what it is for a moral value to exist as a mere 
abstraction. Atheistic moral realists seem to lack any adequate foun­
dation in reality for moral values but just leave them floating in an 
unintelligible way.43
This passage suggests a number of objections to atheistic moral realism. 
It should be noted that some of these objections would tell against a view 
like that of Adams. This is problematic for Craig and Moreland, as they 
routinely turn to Adams to handle objections to their own theistic version 
of moral realism.44 One objection suggested here is based on the principle 
that all values are properties of persons. Adams's view violates this prin­
ciple in identifying the Good with God; the Good, a value, is declared to 
be not a property of a person but rather an actual person.45 Another objec­
tion suggested by this passage is that all values must have a foundation 
and cannot simply "float." If the idea is that values must be anchored in 
something external to themselves, then Adams's view also violates this 
principle. As noted in the previous section, Adams's view implies that at 
least one value (the Good) has no external foundation.
Still, the meat of the concern in the passage seems to be about the co­
herence or intelligibility of atheistic moral realism. Craig and Moreland
42Moreland and Craig, Christian Worldview, p. 492.
43Ibid.; also see Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong, God?, p. 19.
44See, for example, Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong, God?, pp. 68-69; and J. P. Mo­
reland, Scaling the Secular City: A Defense o f Christianity (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker 
Books, 1987), p. 129.
45See Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, p. 42. Craig emphasizes that God cannot 
be both a person and a property in Paul Copan and William Lane Craig, Creation 
Out o f Nothing: A Biblical, Philosophical, and Scientific Exploration (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Academic, 2004), pp. 177-180.
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puzzle over the concept of justice in particular; how can justice "just exist" 
as a "mere abstraction"? On my view, among the entities that "just exist" 
are states of affairs and properties, as they are understood by a number 
of contemporary philosophers, including Alvin Plantinga. With respect to 
justice, my view is that there are various obtaining states of affairs concern­
ing justice, and that when individual people have the property of being 
just, it is (in part) in virtue of the obtaining of some of these states of affairs. 
For instance, I hold that it is just to give people what they deserve; thus, any­
one who gives others what they deserve thereby instantiates the property 
of justice. The state of affairs that it is just to give people what they deserve 
obtains whether or not any people actually exist, just as various states of 
affairs about dinosaurs obtain even though there are no longer any dino­
saurs. In this way, my approach cashes out the idea of justice "just existing" 
in terms of facts about justice. This approach is perfectly intelligible and 
coherent and no more posits mysterious, floating entities than does any 
view committed to the existence of properties and states of affairs.
My view does violate the principles that (i) all values are properties of 
persons and (ii) all values have external foundations.46 I suggest that the 
lesson to be drawn from this is that (i) and (ii) are false; certainly Craig and 
Moreland provide no arguments for such principles. Moreover, Adams's 
approach, to which Craig and Moreland often appeal, also violates both 
principles. Finally, the approach that Craig explicitly endorses violates 
the second principle, as we will see in the following section. It turns out 
that Adams, Craig, Moreland, and I are all committed to the existence of 
basic ethical facts. If this is right, then none of us can reasonably criticize 
the approach of the other on the grounds that it posits values with no 
external foundation.
5. Rights and Duties without God
The deist Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence that 
all men "are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights."47 
Some have suggested that the presence of a divine Creator is an essential 
component of this equation; without such a Creator, human beings would 
lack moral rights and duties altogether.
Craig urges this sort of argument on a variety of grounds. In a debate 
with the atheist Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, he says this:
[I]f there is no God, then what's so special about human beings? 
They're just accidental by-products of nature that have evolved rel­
atively recently on an infinitesimal speck of dust lost somewhere 
in a hostile and mindless universe and that are doomed to per­
ish individually and collectively in a relatively short time. On the 
atheistic view, some action, say, rape, may not be socially advan­
tageous, and so in the course of human development has become 
taboo; but that does absolutely nothing to prove that rape is really
46I assume here that 'value' is construed broadly to include ethical facts.
47For Jefferson's deism, see R. B. Bernstein, Thomas Jefferson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 139-140 and 179.
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wrong. On the atheistic view, there's nothing really wrong with
your raping someone.48
Elsewhere, Craig bluntly asserts that "on atheism, we are just animals, 
and animals don't have moral duties."49 In earlier writing, he characterizes 
human life in a godless universe as "not qualitatively different from that 
of a dog" and man as "a freak of nature . . . a lump of slime that evolved 
into rationality."50
These arguments take the following form: If God does not exist, then 
human beings are just Xs, and Xs don't have moral rights or duties. Let us 
examine the first premise of this line of reasoning. Spelled out more fully, 
the claim is that without God, human beings are Xs—and they are noth­
ing more than Xs. The second component of this claim is both essential to 
Craig's argument and dubious.
Consider the first argument quoted above. It runs as follows: Without 
God, human beings are accidental, evolved, mortal, short-lived products 
of nature—and human beings are nothing more than this.51 This is about 
as plausible as the claim that according to theism, God is a necessar­
ily existing being — and nothing more than this. While it is true that ac­
cording to theism, God is a necessarily existing being, theists maintain 
that there is much more to God than this. Similarly, while contemporary 
atheists typically maintain that human beings are accidental, evolved, 
mortal, and relatively short-lived, they also maintain that there is much 
more to human beings than this. They can reason, suffer, fall in love, set 
goals for themselves, and so on. Therefore, it is open to the atheist to 
maintain that it is precisely the sorts of non-moral properties of human 
beings that Craig implicitly denies in his "nothing more than" character­
ization of humans in a godless universe that ground human moral rights 
and obligations.
It may be that Craig means to suggest that human beings can have cer­
tain rights-grounding non-moral features only if God exists. C. S. Lewis, 
for example, maintained that the human capacity to reason requires the 
existence of an eternal, self-existent, rational being.52 If this is what is go­
ing on, then this aspect of Craig's moral argument really collapses into
48Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong, God?, p. 18.
49Ibid.; also see Moreland and Craig, Christian Worldview, p. 492.
50William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, revised edition (Wheaton, IL: Crossway 
Books, 1994), pp. 62-63.
51It is worth noting here that "accidental" must be understood as synonymous 
with "not a result of intentional design" but not with "a result of entirely random 
processes." According to contemporary evolutionary theory, evolutionary pro­
cesses are not, contrary to popular mischaracterizations, entirely chance-driven. 
Rather, they are driven by a combination of chance and necessity; see Ernst Mayr, 
What Evolution Is (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 119-120.
52See C. S. Lewis, Miracles: A Preliminary Study (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 
pp. 43-44. For useful philosophical examinations of this argument, see Victor Rep- 
pert, C. S. Lewis's Dangerous Idea (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003); and 
Erik Wielenberg, God and the Reach o f Reason (New York: Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 93-108.
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another kind of argument altogether. It is one thing to claim that without 
God, humans can reason but nevertheless lack moral rights; it is some­
thing else altogether to claim that without God, humans cannot reason 
and consequently lack moral rights. Here I will consider only the first sort 
of argument. This is not because I think that arguments of the second sort 
are not worth considering, but rather because the focus of this paper is 
the moral argument, and arguments of the second sort are, at bottom, not 
moral arguments at all.53
Sinnott-Armstrong takes Craig to be giving the first kind of argument 
and adopts the very strategy I described above. He suggests that the non­
moral differences between human beings and other animals ground moral 
differences between humans and other animals:
[L]ower animals . . . are not moral agents. They do not make free 
choices. Their actions are not determined by any conception of what 
is moral or not. That explains why moral rules and principles do not 
apply to lower animals any more than they apply to avalanches that 
kill people.54
With respect to the wrongness of rape, Sinnott-Armstrong says, "[w]hat 
makes rape immoral is that it harms the victim in terrible ways. The victim 
feels pain, loses freedom, is subordinated, and so on. These harms are not 
justified by any benefits to anyone."55 Sinnott-Armstrong thus seeks to ex­
plain the wrongness of rape by implicitly appealing to a moral principle, 
a principle along the lines of this one: Any action that involves know­
ingly inflicting suffering, subordination, and a loss of freedom on another 
without producing any outweighing benefits is morally wrong. Such a 
principle strikes me as quite plausible.
Craig's critique of Sinnott-Armstrong's response has two main ele­
ments. First, he questions whether the moral principle to which Sinnott- 
Armstrong appeals holds in the context of atheism: "[G]iven atheism, 
why think that it is true? Why, given atheism, think that inflicting harm 
on other people would have any moral dimension at all?"56 This amounts 
to a demand that Sinnott-Armstrong provide a foundation for the moral 
principle that he relied on to explain the wrongness of rape—and that 
he do so as an atheist, that is, without an appeal to God or related phe­
nomena. This response reveals an assumption that underlies much of 
Craig's criticism of non-theistic approaches to moral realism: Objective
53For a sketch of the second kind of argument, see Paul Copan, "The Moral 
Argument," in The Rationality o f Theism, ed. Paul Copan and Paul K. Moser (New 
York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 157-160.
54Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong, God?, p. 34. In endorsing Sinnott-Armstrong's 
reply to Craig here, I do not mean to suggest that Sinnott-Armstrong would accept 
the meta-ethical view I am defending in this paper. But Sinnott-Armstrong's reply 
is, as far as I can see, compatible with my view.
55Ibid.
56Ibid., p. 67.
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morality requires a foundation external to itself.57 But why accept such 
an assumption? Another possibility is a view like mine, according to 
which all (non-brute) ethical facts rest at least in part on a set of basic 
ethical facts. Such basic ethical facts are the axioms of morality and, as 
such, do not have an external foundation. Rather, they are the foundation 
of morality.
The second element of Craig's critique of Sinnott-Armstrong's discus­
sion of the wrongness of rape is a charge of circularity: "[A]ren't we presup­
posing morality in trying to ground morality? We're saying that an action 
is morally unjustified if it causes harm that is morally unjustified—no 
duh!"58 Sinnott-Armstrong tried to account for the truth of one ethical fact 
(the wrongness of rape) by appealing to another, more general ethical fact. 
Craig's characterization of this response as circular is surely off the mark; 
if explaining the truth of a given fact of a particular type by appealing to 
a more general fact of the same type constitutes an objectionable form of 
circularity, then objectionable circularity is far more widespread than any­
one realizes. Craig's characterization of Sinnott-Armstrong's response as 
"presupposing morality in trying to ground morality" is also inaccurate. 
Sinnott-Armstrong is not trying to "ground morality" at all; he is trying to 
account for the moral wrongness of rape. Craig's mischaracterization here 
is further evidence that what underlies his position is the assumption that 
objective morality requires a foundation external to itself.
The discussion of this section so far serves to highlight the centrality 
of the assumption that objective morality requires an external foundation 
to Craig's overall attack on atheistic moral realism. I have two main criti­
cisms of Craig's reliance on this principle. First, Craig assumes it without 
argument and hence simply begs the question against a view like mine. 
Second, and more importantly, Craig's own approach to objective moral­
ity violates this very principle, as I will now show.
In the debate with Sinnott-Armstrong, Craig suggests that "our moral 
duties are grounded in the commands of a holy and loving God . . . His 
nature expresses itself toward us in the form of moral commands which, 
issuing from the Good, become moral duties for us."59 This explanation 
of the origin of our moral duties depends on an ungrounded ethical fact, 
something along these lines: If the Good commands you to do something, 
then you are morally obligated to do it. The atheist might well ask: What 
is the grounding for this ethical claim? Does it simply float mysteriously 
in an unintelligible way?
When explaining how God provides an adequate foundation for objec­
tive morality, Craig and Moreland, like Wainwright, look to the view of 
Adams.60 We have already seen that Adams's view rests on a number of 
substantive, metaphysically necessary brute ethical facts. Here we may 
also observe that, like Craig's brief account of divine command theory, Ad­
57See, for example, Craig's concluding remarks in his 1991 debate with Kai 
Nielsen at: www.leaderu.com / offices / billcraig / docs / craig-nielsen7.html (accessed 
5 /22 /08); and Craig, "Reply," in Wallace, Craig-Flew Debate, p. 171.
58Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong, God?, p. 68.
59Ibid., 68-69.
60See, for example, ibid.; and Moreland, Secular City, p. 129.
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ams's much more developed version of divine command theory relies on 
ethical claims for which no further explanation is provided, including the 
following: (i) Only good social relationships can generate morally good 
reasons to obey commands, (ii) the better the character of the commander, 
the more reason there is to obey his or her commands, and (iii) the better 
the command itself, the more reason there is to obey it.61 My point is not 
that the ethical claims Adams appeals to are false or implausible but rather 
that Adams provides no explanation for them. Within his system, they ap­
pear to be brute ethical facts. This is not particularly surprising; as Ralph 
Cudworth pointed out in the seventeenth century,
that we should be obliged to obey . . . must proceed from . . . the right 
or authority of the commander, which is founded in natural justice 
and equity, and an antecedent obligation to obedience in the sub­
jects. Which things are not made by laws, but presupposed before all 
laws to make them valid.62
Cudworth's point: God's ability to impose obligations by way of His com­
mands depends on the truth of certain ethical facts that are not themselves 
grounded in God. At least in the case of the accounts of Craig and Adams, 
Cudworth is right.63 Therefore, if Sinnott-Armstrong is guilty of "presup­
posing morality in trying to ground morality," then Craig and Adams, and 
consequently Moreland as well, are similarly guilty. Both sides appeal to 
ethical claims for which they provide no foundation.
This reveals the hollowness of the following complaint raised by Craig 
against theories of the sort I am defending in this paper:
[M]y experience with such theories is that they inevitably just assume 
gratuitously that on a naturalistic view of man, some feature of hu­
man existence, say, pleasure, is an intrinsic good, and then proceed 
from there. But the advocates o f such theories are typically at a loss to jus­
tify their starting point. If their approach to meta-ethical theory is to be 
. . . 'serious metaphysics' rather than just 'a shopping list' approach, 
whereby one simply helps oneself to the supervenient moral proper­
ties needed to do the job, then some sort of explanation is required 
for why moral properties supervene on certain natural states.64
Notice the demand that proponents of non-theistic meta-ethical theories 
justify their starting points by providing explanations for their founda­
61See Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, pp. 244-245. It might be suggested that the 
three ethical claims listed here are analytic, to which I offer a two-fold reply: (i) No 
they are not, and (ii) even if they are, Adams is nevertheless committed to the exis­
tence of non-analytic, necessary brute ethical facts, as I argued in section 3 above.
62Ralph Cudworth, A Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality (Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 18. Mackie makes a similar point; 
see Mackie, Miracle o f Theism, pp. 114-115.
63Cudworth's point applies to Swinburne's version of divine command theory 
as well; see Swinburne, Coherence o f Theism, pp. 204-209.
64Craig, "Reply," in Wallace, Craig-Flew Debate, p. 171, emphasis added.
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tional ethical claims. This demand is reasonable only if there can be no 
basic ethical facts. However, not only does Craig fail to provide any good 
reason to think that there cannot be any basic ethical facts, his own theistic 
approach to morality depends on such facts. Therefore, both parties to 
the debate are stuck with a "shopping list" approach; the only difference 
between them is the contents of their respective lists. Craig at one point 
seems at least implicitly to acknowledge this:
The question might be pressed as to why God's nature should be 
taken to be definitive of goodness. But, unless, we are nihilists, we 
have to recognize some ultimate standard of value, and God seems 
to be the least arbitrary stopping point.65
Once we get past all the talk of unintelligible floating values, circularity, 
gratuitousness, and shopping lists, it turns out that Craig's position is 
simply that the brute ethical facts posited by theistic approaches like his 
own are less arbitrary than the brute ethical facts posited by non-theistic 
approaches to ethics. Let us, therefore, put to rest once and for all the 
demand that non-theists ground all of their ethical claims. Neither a theist 
like Craig nor an adherent of my version of non-theistic moral realism can 
satisfy this demand.
In the passage just quoted Craig claims that nihilism is false only if there 
is a single ultimate standard of value. This is mere question-begging; my 
view posits no such single standard and yet is incompatible with nihilism. 
What may be true is that nihilism is false only if there are basic ethical 
facts. But this principle makes no trouble for my view. Craig goes on to 
say this:
God's nature is singularly appropriate to serve as [an ultimate stan­
dard of value] because, by definition, He is a being worthy of worship. 
And only a being which is the locus and source of all value is worthy 
of worship.66
The claim here appears to be that part of the meaning of the word 'God' is 
'a being worthy of worship.' From this it follows that the central brute fact 
of traditional monotheism—that God exists—includes the fact that there is 
a being worthy of worship, thereby rendering this fact brute as well. But 
that there is a being worthy of worship is an ethical fact; in the passage just 
quoted, Craig thus commits himself once more to the existence of substan­
tive, metaphysically necessary brute ethical facts.
It is somewhat misleading to characterize theorists like Adams and 
Craig as providing a theistic foundation for objective morality. This char­
acterization can easily give the impression that, on their approaches, all 
objective ethical facts are explained by God. But this is not at all the case. 
What is really going on is that some objective ethical facts are explained 
by appeal to other basic ethical facts (some of which are also supernatu­
65Ibid., p. 173.
66Ibid. Also see Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong, God?, p. 69.
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ral facts). Adams, Craig, and I all agree, then, that objective morality is 
somehow built into reality. We all posit a moral foundation of substantive, 
metaphysically necessary brute ethical facts. They also see divinity as built 
into reality, whereas I do not. But it is a mistake to think that on their ap­
proaches, the divinity that is built into reality provides a complete external 
foundation for objective morality. On both types of views, the bottom floor 
of objective morality rests ultimately on nothing.
The ethical shopping list of Adams, Craig, and Moreland contains items 
like this: (a) there is a being that is worthy of worship, (b) if the Good com­
mands you to do something, then you are morally obligated to do it, and 
(c) the better the character of the commander, the more reason there is to 
obey his or her commands. My ethical shopping list contains items like 
this: (d) pain is intrinsically bad, (e) inflicting pain just for fun is morally 
wrong, and (f) it is just to give people what they deserve. None of us can 
provide an external foundation for every item on our list; each of our lists 
contains some brute ethical facts.
In light of this, one can perhaps forgive the non-theistic moral realist for 
being somewhat underwhelmed by the argument that endorsing that there 
is a being worthy o f worship as a basic ethical fact is less arbitrary than, say, 
endorsing that pleasure is an intrinsic good as a basic ethical fact. If Craig and 
Moreland's support for the premise that the existence of objective ethical 
facts requires the existence of God boils down to the claim that (a)-(c) are 
less arbitrary than (d)-(f), then their moral argument for the existence of 
God is on shaky ground indeed.
With these points firmly in mind, let us return to the issue that launched 
this discussion: the source of human moral rights and obligations. What is 
it? I propose the following answer: Necessarily, any being that can reason, 
suffer, experience happiness, tell the difference between right and wrong, 
choose between right and wrong, and set goals for itself has certain rights, 
including the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and cer­
tain obligations, including the duty to refrain from rape (in typical circum- 
stances).67 Evolutionary processes have produced human beings that can 
reason, suffer, experience happiness, tell the difference between right and 
wrong, choose between right and wrong, and set goals for themselves. In 
this way, evolutionary processes have endowed us with certain unalien­
able rights and duties. Evolution has given us these moral properties by 
giving us the non-moral properties upon which they supervene. And if, as 
I believe, there is no God, then it is in some sense an accident that we have 
the moral properties that we do. But that they are accidental in origin does 
not make these moral properties unreal or unimportant.68
67Note that this principle specifies only a sufficient condition for the possession 
of certain rights and duties, not a necessary condition.
68Against this sort of approach, Copan offers the slogan: "From valuelessness, 
valuelessness comes" (Copan, "Moral Argument," in Copan and Moser, Rational­
ity o f Theism, p. 159). This slogan is catchy, but terribly question-begging. I offer my 
own slogan in its place: From valuelessness, value sometimes comes.
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6. Conclusion
Atheism and amorality are often linked in popular thought. I believe this 
is a mistake. In this paper I have sought to present a plausible version of 
non-theistic moral realism and defend it against a variety of objections. 
The arguments of this paper, if successful, should cast doubt on the view 
that atheism and moral realism are at odds with each other—or should at 
least provoke further thought on the part of defenders of theistic moral 
arguments. My sense is that much of the skepticism about the prospect 
of objective ethical truth in a godless universe stems from the under­
examined assumption that all ethical truths must ultimately rest on a non­
ethical foundation. As I have emphasized, I believe that this assumption 
should not only be examined but rejected. Indeed, as I have shown, many 
theistic critics of views like mine are committed to the rejection of this as­
sumption. With this assumption out of the way, one of the main obstacles 
to non-natural non-theistic moral realism has been removed.69
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